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BACKGROUND
• In 2013, Internet2 leadership and board of trustees were concerned by the increasing 
sophistication of attacks
• Internet2 did not have a security program in place designed to defend the national 
R&E network from attack
• Many NRENs do not have mature security programs in place
• In early 2014, Internet2 created the role of Chief Cyberinfrastructure Security officer to 
develop and lead a security program that would protect the national R&E network and 
its members 
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SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT APPROACH
1. Gathered information
– NIST SP 800-53 Security & Privacy Controls – Moderate (268 questions)
– Technical interviews of engineers
– Reviewed logs, policies, configurations, visited PoPs, Internet2 and Level3 NOCs
2. Identified threats and vulnerabilities
3. Analyzed risks and proposed corrective actions
4. Presented findings to leadership for decisions
5. Began implementation of improvements
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THREATS
Cause	effects	from	outside	
•Damage	reputation
•Access	content
•Disrupt	/	degrade		
bandwidth	on	demand
•Redirect		traffic	path	on	
demand
•Steal	bandwidth
•Weaponize infrastructure
Cause	effects	as	a	subscriber
•Access		core	content
•Degrade	or	interrupt		core		
on	demand
Threat	Actors
• Nation	States
• Criminals
• Disgruntled	
Insiders
• Vandals
Threat	Motivation
Compromise	Confidentiality
• Nation	State	(high)
• Criminals	(med)
• Disgruntled	Insiders	(med)
• Vandals	(low)
Compromise		Availability
• Nation	States	(high)
• Criminals	(med)
• Disgruntled	Insiders	(med)
• Vandals	(med)
Capabilities
• Targeting	&	Ops	Design
– Open	source	
– Social	engineering	
• Network	penetration	
– Known	exploits
– 0-day	exploits	
– Phishing	and	water-holes
• Data	Collection
– High	Bandwidth	
collection	and	exfiltration
– Close	access	collection
• Physical	penetration	operations
• Insider	compromise
• Supply	chain	manipulation
• Remote	control	devices
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BASELINE SECURITY ASSESSMENT FINDINGS
• Current	security	practices	would	not	resist	intentional	targeting	and	exploitation	by	well-resourced	
and	determined	adversarial	threats
• It	is	likely	that	such	a	threat	would	be	able	to	successfully	compromise	both	the	confidentiality	and	
availability	of	the	network
• Current	security	practices	were	primarily	designed	to	address	human	error,	environmental	hazards,	
and	to	enable	rapid	recovery	and	reconstitution	of	services
• Security	practices	have	evolved	organically,	are	not	formally	stated,	documented,	shared	or	
monitored	throughout	the	enterprise
• The	lack	of	a	formal	security	program	introduces	opportunities	for	significant	exploitable	gaps	in	protection
• Inadequate	protection	of	the	management	network	is	the	most	exploitable	vulnerability	discovered	
during	the	assessment
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High Threat Potential Initial Current Target
Security Assessment and Authorization
Security Planning and Privacy Impact
Risk Assessment
Audit and Accountability
Incident Response
Identification and Authentication
Medium Threat Potential
System, Communications and Availability Protection 
System and Information Integrity
Access Control 
Awareness and Training
Physical and Environmental Protection
Low Threat Potential
Configuration Management
Contingency Planning
Maintenance
Media Protection
Personnel Security
System and Services Acquisition Ref: NIST SP 800-53
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SHORT TERM IMPROVEMENTS
• Reduced the number of staff from 100 to 28 that have administrative privileges to 
network systems (routers/switches/controllers)
• Improved user authentication by using two-factor authentication on the network 
systems (routers/ switches/controllers)
• Removed operationally sensitive information (e.g., IP addresses of AuthN servers) 
from public view
• Designed an out-of-band secure management network
• Dedicated security team formed
• Developed security operations capabilities including security log analysis
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SHORT TERM IMPROVEMENTS CONTINUED
• Developed quarterly procedure to review ACLs for in-band management and removed 
over half of stale entries during the first review
• Credentialed scanning of NOC servers and core packet forwarding systems (i.e., 
routers and switches) 
• Consistent ticketing of DDoS attacks as security tickets
• ARP spoof monitoring in public exchanges
• Incident response procedure implemented
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LONG TERM IMPROVEMENTS
• Security awareness education for staff based on SANS Securing the Human
• Periodic security assessments performed
• Implementation of out-of-band secure management network
• Promote adoption of improved routing security methods (e.g., GTSM, RPKI, BCP38)
• Improve physical security at physical sites
• DDoS mitigation (strategy at http://www.internet2.edu/blogs/detail/12234)
– Commercial scrubbing services
– Flowspec
– RTBH
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xntpd[21521]: sendto(<Target IP>): No route to host
xntpd[21521]: too many recvbufs allocated (40)
NTP REFLECTION DOS ATTACK FROM A MISCONFIGURED ROUTER
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MIRAI PORT SCANNING SCANNING
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IPV4 DISCARDS BY SOURCE ASN AND DEST PORT
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DISCARDS MINUS DNS, BFD, BGP
IPv4
IPv6
